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WHEN, WHERE AND WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS 
THE RIGHT TO RECORD POLICE COMMUNICATIONS: A 
SUBSTANTIAL INTERFERENCE GUIDELINE FOR DETERMINING 
THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO RECORD AND FOR REVAMPING 
RESTRICTIVE STATE WIRETAPPING LAWS 
INTRODUCTION 
To some, if not most, “[w]iretapping sounds like it should involve a man in 
a headset sitting in a van listening in on your telephone calls.”1 However, the 
legal definition of wiretapping in some states encompasses much more than 
this, and even conduct the average individual does not realize is a crime.2 In 
some states, it does not take a man sitting in a van with a headset to commit 
wiretapping. Rather, all it takes is a Blackberry or an iPhone capable of 
recording audio. The penalty for audio recording the oral communications of a 
police officer in Illinois in the absence of the officer’s permission: a Class 1 
felony3 carrying up to fifteen years in prison.4 Recording others is a Class 4 
felony5 carrying a maximum sentence of three years in prison.6 The penalty in 
Massachusetts for recording the oral communications of an officer in the 
absence of the officer’s permission: up to five years in state prison.7 In Illinois, 
it is a crime to record the oral communications of two or more persons 
regardless of whether the parties intended their conversation to be private 
unless the recording party has the permission of all the parties to the 
conversation.8 In Massachusetts, it is illegal to secretly record any oral 
communication without the consent of all the parties to the conversation.9 
To illustrate the problem the Illinois wiretapping law creates, take 
Tiawanda Moore, age 21, who, with the help of her Blackberry, was charged 
 
 1. Rob Arcamona, Jeff Hermes, & Andy Sellars, Wiretapping, SOPA, Occupy: 2011 Was a 
Tumultuous Year in Media Law, PBS (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2011/12/ 
wiretapping-sopa-occupy-2011-was-a-tumultuous-year-in-media-law357.html (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 2. Id. 
 3. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(b) (2010). Audio recording the oral communications of 
public officials and judges without consent is also a Class 1 felony. Id. 
 4. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-30(a). 
 5. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(a). 
 6. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-45(a). 
 7. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(C)(1) (2010). 
 8. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(1). 
 9. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 99(B)(4), (C)(1). 
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with the offense of eavesdropping after she secretly recorded a conversation 
she had with Internal Affairs police officers who tried to discourage her from 
filing a formal complaint against a police officer who had groped her.10 The 
incident started when an officer responded to a domestic violence call at the 
apartment Moore and her then-boyfriend shared.11 As Moore was being 
interviewed in her bedroom, the police officer allegedly grabbed her breasts 
and buttocks before suggesting they should “hook up.”12 Moore went to police 
headquarters to report the incident and when interviewed was met with officers 
discouraging her from filing a complaint.13 When the officers left her alone in 
the interview room, she turned on the recorder function on her cell phone.14 
When the officers became aware that the recorder was running, they arrested 
Moore for eavesdropping.15 She spent two weeks in the Cook County Jail.16 
Because Moore recorded the oral communications of the officers without their 
consent, she faced up to fifteen years in prison.17 Moore, like most, was not 
aware the law existed.18 She fought the charges for a year and was acquitted by 
a jury last summer.19 
As evidenced by Ms. Moore’s ordeal, wiretapping in Illinois can have 
grave consequences.20 The consequences are similar in Massachusetts.21 
However, the recording of police communications is a protected First 
Amendment newsgathering right subject to reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions.22 Therefore, complete and absolute bans on audio recording are in 
conflict with the First Amendment. Furthermore, the laws are outdated. The 
Illinois and Massachusetts wiretapping laws were written ages ago, before any 
American carried a mobile device capable of recording audio.23 Today, not 
only are these devices readily available, but social media sites such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube allow recorders viable media outlets to 
 
 10. Andy Grimm, Woman acquitted in eavesdropping case files lawsuit against Chicago 
Police, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 14, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-01-14/news/chi-wo 
man-tiawanda-moore-acquitted-in-eavesdropping-case-against-chicago-police-department-files-
lawsuit-20120114_1_eavesdropping-moore-claims-lawsuit. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Grimm, supra note 10. 
 16. Id. 
 17. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(b) (2010). 
 18. Grimm, supra note 10. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(b). 
 21. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(C)(1) (2010). 
 22. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 23. See 1961 Ill. Law 1983; 1959 Mass. Acts 400. 
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express themselves and publish such videos as well.24 Today, unlike forty 
years ago, technology allows every person to be a potential reporter or 
journalist,25 or even a potential moviemaker.26 
The purpose of this Note is three-fold. First, it addresses the federal 
wiretapping law and various states’ wiretapping laws, including Massachusetts 
and Illinois. Illinois and Massachusetts will be specifically addressed because 
they are among the most restrictive in the nation.27 Second, this Note will 
address those courts that have held that the recording of police 
communications is a protected First Amendment newsgathering right. 
Recently, the First Circuit, in Glik v. Cunniffe, held that the audio recording of 
police communications enjoys broad First Amendment protection.28 The Third 
Circuit, in Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, held similarly, but unlike the Glik 
court, described the First Amendment right narrowly.29 It should be noted at 
the outset that this note addresses only those laws that prohibit the interception 
of a police officer’s oral communications and how those laws conform with the 
protections of the First Amendment. The act of merely video recording the 
police without intercepting audio will not be addressed.30 Lastly, based in large 
part on Glik and Kelly, this Note proposes a practical guideline both for 
determining the scope and confines of the First Amendment right to record 
police communications and for revamping constitutionally defective state 
wiretapping laws. The guideline provides that the First Amendment protects an 
individual’s right to audio record a uniformed, on duty police officer’s oral 
communications unless the recording would “substantially interfere” with the 
performance of the officer’s duties. 
I.  THE LANDSCAPE OF WIRETAPPING LAW 
A. Federal Law 
The Federal Wiretap Act was enacted by Congress as part of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Title III”).31 It prohibits any 
 
 24. See Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights 
Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 616–17 (2009). 
 25. Id. at 617. 
 26. Adam Cohen, Should Videotaping the Police Really Be a Crime?, TIME (Aug. 4, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2008566,00.html. 
 27. See infra Part I.B. 
 28. 655 F.3d at 82, 85. 
 29. 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d. Cir. 2010). 
 30. Videotaping of public officials has been held though to be an exercise of First 
Amendment liberties. Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 31. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2006); Shana K. Rahavy, The Federal Wiretap Act: The 
Permissible Scope of Eavesdropping in the Family Home, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 87, 88 (2003). 
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person from intentionally intercepting any oral communication.32 The penalty: 
up to five years in prison.33 “Intercept,” as defined within the statute, means 
“the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any . . . oral communication 
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”34 “Oral 
communication” is defined as any communication “uttered by a person 
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to 
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation . . . .”35 This 
definition of “oral communication” came in response to the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Katz v. United States36 and was a conscious effort by 
Congress to strike a balance between the privacy rights of individuals and the 
legitimate investigatory needs of law enforcement.37 
In Katz, FBI agents attached an electronic recording device to a public 
telephone booth in order to record Katz’s conversations.38 Based on those 
conversations, Katz was arrested for illegal betting.39 The Supreme Court 
overturned the conviction, holding that Katz was entitled to privacy in his oral 
communications even though the conversation he was arrested for occurred in 
a public phone booth.40 Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, established 
the test for determining when constitutional protection attaches to personal 
conversations.41 For constitutional protection to attach to a personal 
conversation, the speaker must have exhibited an actual expectation that the 
conversation was intended to be private, and the expectation must be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.42 The “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” test established by Justice Harlan has been routinely applied by the 
Supreme Court when determining the confines of the Fourth Amendment.43 
Like Katz, the Federal Wiretap Act prohibits the interception of an oral 
communication only when the parties to the conversation have a reasonable 
expectation that their communications will be private.44 Furthermore, an 
 
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2006). 
 33. Id. § 2511(4)(a). 
 34. Id. § 2510(4). 
 35. Id. § 2510(2). 
 36. 389 U.S. 347 (1967), superceded by statute, Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act 
of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–20, as recognized in United States v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
 37. Rahavy, supra note 31, at 88. 
 38. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 352. 
 41. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (referencing several cases 
applying Justice Harlan’s test to Fourth Amendment challenges between 1967 and 2000, and 
again applying the test to a Fourth Amendment issue in 2011). 
 44. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2006). 
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interception of an oral communication is not prohibited if the recorder of the 
communication is a party to the communication or if one of the parties to the 
communication offers prior consent.45 After enactment of Title III, forty-nine 
states passed or amended their wiretapping laws.46 The states were free to 
enact more restrictive wiretapping laws.47 Most did not.48 Forty states,49 like 
the federal government, subscribe to the one-party consent approach, where if 
one party consents to the recording, no interception occurs.50 
B. Restrictive State Wiretapping Laws 
There are at least two state wiretapping laws that are substantially more 
restrictive than their federal counterpart and the laws of nearly every other 
state. The analysis focuses on the Massachusetts and Illinois wiretapping laws 
because they are the most restrictive. However, other states, such as California, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington, have also enacted strict wiretapping laws.51 
1. Massachusetts 
Under the Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Act, anyone who secretly 
intercepts any oral communication without the consent of all parties is guilty of 
unlawful interception.52 Unlike the federal wiretapping law, where only one 
party must consent to the recording,53 the Massachusetts law requires every 
 
 45. Id. § 2511(2)(d). 
 46. Marianne F. Kies, Note, Policing the Police: Freedom of the Press, the Right to Privacy, 
and Civilian Recordings of Police Activity, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 274, 280 (2011). 
 47. Id. at 280–81. 
 48. See id. at 281 n.43 (only eleven states were listed as having enacted more restrictive laws 
than the federal government as of November 2011). 
 49. See Jesse Harlan Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era?: The Need for Safeguards 
in State Wiretapping Statutes to Preserve the Civilian’s Right to Record Public Police Activity, 9 
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 487, 495 (2011) (noting that ten states require all-party consent). 
 50. Id. at 493, 495. 
 51. See id. at 496–500 (explaining that California’s wiretapping law “flatly criminalizes the 
recordation of telephonic, electronic, and other wire communications, without the consent of all 
parties, whether the recorded party displays a reasonable expectation of privacy or not”; that 
Pennsylvania’s laws track the federal statute word for word with the exception of adding a 
provision requiring all party consent; and that Washington’s laws impose criminal penalties on 
anyone that intercepts “private conversations” without obtaining consent from all parties). 
 52. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(C)(1) (2010). The statute states in relevant part: 
[A]ny person who willfully commits an interception, attempts to commit an interception, 
or procures any other person to commit an interception or to attempt to commit an 
interception of any wire or oral communication shall be fined not more than ten thousand 
dollars, or imprisoned in the state prison for not more than five years . . . . 
Id. 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2006). 
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party to consent.54 The term intercept “means to secretly hear, secretly record, 
or aid another to secretly hear or secretly record the contents of any wire or 
oral communication through the use of any intercepting device by any person 
other than a person given prior authority by all parties to such 
communication . . . .”55 As seen, the statute draws a distinction based on 
whether the recording was made secretly or in plain view,56 not on whether the 
speaker intended for the conversation to be private. If the recording was made 
in plain view, the interception is not illegal.57 However, if the recording is 
made secretly or covertly and the recorder does not have the consent of the 
parties, the interception is illegal.58 
To illustrate the problem posed by a wiretapping statute that does not hinge 
on whether the speakers intended their conversation to be private, take 
Commonwealth v. Hyde, a heavily criticized 2001 decision by the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts.59 In that case, the court upheld the conviction 
of a motorist for wiretapping after he secretly recorded statements made by 
police officers during a traffic stop.60 Mr. Hyde was stopped by police officers 
because his car had a broken taillight and a loud exhaust system.61 The 
situation escalated and Hyde accused the officers of stopping him because he 
had “long hair.”62 Unknown to the officers, Hyde had activated a hand-held 
tape recorder and recorded the entire encounter.63 A week after the encounter, 
he filed an internal complaint with the police department and offered the tape 
he made of the altercation as proof of harassment.64 Thereafter, the police 
department filed criminal charges against Hyde for the illegal interception of 
an oral communication without the consent of all parties.65 Hyde argued that 
like its federal counterpart, the Massachusetts statute was not applicable under 
the circumstances because the police officers were performing their public 
duties, and therefore had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
conversations.66 Without addressing whether police officers have an 
 
 54. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(B)(4), (C)(1). However, the law did not always require 
all party consent. Prior to 1968, the law permitted the recording of one’s own conversations, or 
conversations with the prior permission of one party. Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 
967 (Mass. 2001). 
 55. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(B)(4). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. § 99(C)(1). 
 59. 750 N.E.2d 963 (2011). 
 60. Id. at 967. 
 61. Id. at 964. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 965. 
 64. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 965. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 967. 
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expectation of privacy in their conversations with members of the public, the 
court held that Title III was inapplicable because the Massachusetts legislature 
intended to “create a more restrictive surveillance statute than comparable 
statutes in other States.”67 Unlike its federal counterpart and the wiretapping 
laws of many other states, there is no expectation of privacy language in the 
statute.68 In upholding Hyde’s conviction, the court stated that the statute 
“prohibit[s] all secret recordings by members of the public, including 
recordings of police officers or other public officials interacting with members 
of the public, when made without their permission or knowledge.”69 
The Hyde decision has been routinely criticized.70 It stands for the 
proposition that one can be criminally prosecuted for the use of an ordinary 
tape recorder to capture the voice of any unknowing person, regardless of the 
setting in which the recording is made or regardless of whether the individual 
being recorded has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
communications.71 The preamble to the Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Act 
provides support that this is the wrong interpretation of the statute.72 The 
preamble states that the statute was enacted for two main purposes: first, to 
deter the efforts of organized crime by permitting law enforcement officials the 
use of modern methods of electronic surveillance, under strict judicial 
supervision, when investigating organized criminal activities, and second, to 
outlaw the secret use of modern electronic surveillance devices among 
citizens.73 Neither reason suggests a basis for restricting an individual’s right to 
use a tape recorder or cell phone to capture the communications that individual 
is having with law enforcement officers. 
Not only has Hyde been criticized, but the validity of the statute under 
which Hyde was convicted has been called into doubt. In Jean v. 
Massachusetts State Police, Jean, a local political activist, maintained a 
website displaying articles and other information critical of a District 
Attorney.74 In October of 2005, a man contacted Jean through her website and 
explained that eight armed State Police troopers arrested him in his home on a 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 968 n.6. 
 69. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 967. 
 70. See, e.g., id. at 974 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that there is no way the 
legislature intended to outlaw “the secret tape recording of a public exchange between a police 
officer and a citizen.”); Lisa A. Skehill, Cloaking Police Misconduct in Privacy: Why the 
Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Statute Should Allow for the Surreptitious Recording of Police 
Officers, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981, 1011 (2009). 
 71. Roger Michel, Criminal Law: Electronic Surveillance—General Laws Chapter 272, 
Section 99, 86 MASS. L. REV. 62, 62 (2001). 
 72. Id. at 63. 
 73. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(A) (2010). 
 74. Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 25 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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misdemeanor charge.75 He met the officers at the front door, where he allowed 
them to handcuff him.76 The officers then conducted a warrantless search of his 
house, which was subsequently audiotaped and videotaped by a “nanny-
cam.”77 The man provided Jean a copy of the recording.78 After she posted the 
video, Jean was contacted by the Massachusetts State Police, who claimed she 
had violated the state wiretapping statute by willfully disclosing the recording 
made without their consent.79 Instead of removing the video, Jean filed a 
complaint in federal district court seeking a temporary restraining order and 
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against the Massachusetts State 
Police.80 Citing her First Amendment right to free speech, Jean sought 
preclusion from threats of prosecution by the officers or enforcement of the 
wiretapping statute against her.81 The district court granted a temporary 
restraining order preventing the police from interfering with Jean’s “disclosure, 
use, or display, including posting on the internet,” of the audio and video 
recording.82 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided the issue as to 
whether the First Amendment prevented the police officers from interfering 
with Jean’s internet posting of the audio and visual recording.83 After finding 
the government interest in preserving privacy and deterring illegal 
interceptions to be insufficiently compelling, the court affirmed the district 
court’s order, stating that “Jean’s publication of the recording on her website 
is . . . entitled to . . . First Amendment protection.”84 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Jean, 492 F.3d at 25–26. It should be noted that Jean was charged with willfully 
disclosing an interception. The statute states that an individual who “willfully discloses or 
attempts to disclose to any person the contents of any wire or oral communication, knowing that 
the information was obtained through interception . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(C)(3)(a) (2010). Since she was not the one who “intercepted” the oral 
communication, she could not be charged with “interception” under section 99(C)(1), a felony. 
However, the court did conclude that the original recording of the search was an illegal 
“interception” under section 99(C)(1). Jean, 492 F.3d at 31. 
 80. Jean, 492 F.3d at 26. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 25. 
 84. Id. at 33. 
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2. Illinois 
Like the Massachusetts wiretapping law, the Illinois Eavesdropping Act 
prohibits secret audio recordings.85 However, it also prohibits open recordings 
regardless of whether the parties intended their conversation to be private.86 
The Act states that “[a] person commits eavesdropping when he . . . 
[k]nowingly and intentionally uses an eavesdropping device for the purpose of 
hearing or recording all or any part of any conversation . . . unless he does so 
with the consent of all of the parties to such conversation.”87 A “conversation” 
is defined broadly to include “any oral communication between 2 or more 
persons regardless of whether one or more of the parties intended their 
communication to be of a private nature under circumstances justifying that 
exception.”88 Therefore, in Illinois, any audio recording, whether open or 
secret, and regardless of whether the parties intended the conversation to be 
private, is prohibited unless all the parties to the conversation consent to the 
recording.89 As seen, the Illinois statue expressly declines to follow the one-
party consent approach taken by its federal counterpart.90 
The definition of “conversation” was added by the Illinois legislature in 
1994.91 By adding the definition, the Illinois legislature “extended the coverage 
of the eavesdropping statute to all conversations, regardless of whether they 
were intended to be private.”92 Two cases that preceded the additional 
definition shed light on why the Illinois legislature added the definition of 
“conversation” to the statue in 1994 and how the eavesdropping statute was 
interpreted by courts prior to the addition.93 
In People v. Klingenberg, the defendant was arrested and charged with 
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.94 While in police 
custody, the defendant performed specified physical acts intended to determine 
the extent to which he was intoxicated.95 An audiovisual recording was made 
of the defendant’s responses and his performance of the coordination tasks.96 
 
 85. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(1) (2010). Eavesdropping and wiretapping will be used 
interchangeably throughout this Note and, for the purposes of this Note, consist of the same 
conduct. 
 86. Id. 5/14-1(d). 
 87. Id. 5/14-2(a)(1). 
 88. Id. 5/14-1(d) (emphasis added). 
 89. Id. 
 90. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2006). 
 91. People v. Nestrock, 735 N.E.2d 1101, 1107 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
 92. Id. (quoting People v. Siwek, 671 N.E.2d 358, 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 93. Id. 
 94. 339 N.E.2d 456, 457 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). 
 95. See id. 
 96. Id. 
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Upon the defendant’s motion, the circuit court suppressed the audio portion of 
the recording on the theory that it was made in violation of the eavesdropping 
statute.97 The appellate court reversed and held that the recording of the 
defendant’s voice during the in-custodial interrogation was not 
“eavesdropping” within the meaning of the statute.98 In determining whether 
the recording of the defendant’s responses constituted eavesdropping, the 
appellate court examined whether the legislature intended to protect this type 
of communication from interception.99 The court found in the negative, 
holding that “the framers of the statute intended the term ‘eavesdropping’ to 
refer to the listening to or recording of those oral statements intended by the 
declarant to be of a private nature.”100 Therefore, the court concluded that “the 
statute was enacted to protect the individual from the interception of 
communication intended to be private.”101 Because the defendant was talking 
directly to deputies, the court ruled the defendant did not intend his 
conversation to be private and thus had no expectation of privacy in his 
communications.102 
In People v. Beardsley, Mr. Beardsley was pulled over for speeding.103 
After refusing to surrender his driver’s license to officers, he was placed in the 
back of a squad car.104 While sitting there, he openly recorded a conversation 
between the arresting officer and his partner sitting in the front seat.105 The 
officers were not aware they were being recorded.106 The Supreme Court of 
Illinois held that the primary factor in determining whether Beardsley 
committed the offense of eavesdropping was not whether all the parties 
consented to the recording.107 Rather, the primary factor was “whether the 
officers/declarants intended their conversation to be of a private nature under 
circumstances justifying such expectation.”108 The court first noted that if the 
officers had intended their conversation to be private, they would have left the 
squad car instead of carrying on the conversation with Beardsley in the back 
seat.109 Ultimately, the court held that “[b]ecause there was no surreptitious 
interception of a communication intended by the declarants to be private, 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Klingenberg, 339 N.E.2d at 459. 
 99. Id. at 458. 
 100. Id. at 459. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 347 (Ill. 1986). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 348. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 350. 
 108. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 350. 
 109. Id. 
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secret, or confidential, under circumstances justifying such expectation, there 
was no violation of the eavesdropping statute.”110 
Today, it is clear that Klingenberg and Beardsley are superseded by statute 
and, if they were heard today, would be decided differently.111 The 1994 
addition of the term “conversation” makes it clear that the monitoring of 
conversations is illegal in Illinois regardless of whether the parties intended 
their conversation to be of a private nature.112 Based on the legislative history 
of the amendment, the primary purpose of the addition was to reverse the 
Beardsley decision.113 
Also interesting is that the police do not have to play by the same rules in 
Illinois. Uniformed police may, at their discretion and without a warrant, 
record their conversations with civilians during “enforcement stops.”114 
“Enforcement stops” include, but are not limited to, traffic stops, pedestrian 
stops, abandoned vehicle contacts, motorist assists, commercial motor vehicle 
stops, roadside safety checks, requests for identification, and responses to 
requests for emergency assistance.115 Police departments across the country 
now require their officers to record such encounters because there is a growing 
consensus regarding the need to record major evidentiary events in the criminal 
process.116 However, while uniformed police can record virtually all of their 
conversations with the public,117 members of the public are precluded from 
recording those same conversations.118 
Due to advancements in technology, three things have happened in Illinois. 
First, because of the prevalence of cell phones equipped with the ability to 
record audio,119 arrests for violations of Illinois’ Eavesdropping Act have 
become more common.120 Second, due to the convenience of the internet,121 
the public is readily aware of such arrests. Third, due to the popularity of social 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1 (2010). 
 112. People v. Nestrock, 735 N.E.2d 1101, 1107 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
 113. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 5, ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(No. 11–1286). 
 114. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-3(h). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Alderman, supra note 49, at 530–31. 
 117. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 113, at 6. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, 
Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 341 (2011) (noting that in modern 
America, cell phone ownership is nearly universal and virtually every cell phone has digital 
image capacity). 
 120. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 113, at 7–8; c.f. Radley Balko, The War on 
Cameras, REASON MAG., Jan. 2011 at 24, 25.(discussing individuals being prosecuted in various 
states for violations of wiretapping statutes). 
 121. Cohen, supra note 26, at 22. 
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media sites such as YouTube and Twitter,122 the public has opportunity to 
voice their concerns with the perceived injustice the law is accomplishing. In 
regards to arrests, take, for example, Michael H. Allison, a forty-one-year-old 
backyard mechanic from southeastern Illinois123 who was charged with the 
offense of eavesdropping in 2009.124 Prior to being charged with 
eavesdropping, Allison received a city ordinance violation over an alleged 
abandoned vehicle on his premises.125 After receiving the violation, Allison 
recorded conversations he had with police, the city attorney, the circuit clerk’s 
office, and the court concerning the ordinance violation.126 If convicted, 
Allison would have faced up to seventy-five years in prison; all for an act most 
people do not realize is a crime.127 Or, consider Chris Drew, a sixty-one-year-
old artist charged with eavesdropping when he, in the midst of being arrested 
for selling art on a downtown street without a permit, made an audio recording 
of his encounter with the police.128 
Like the Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Act, the validity of the Illinois 
Eavesdropping Act has been called into doubt by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit.129 Troubled by documented cases of police misconduct 
such as Tiawanda Moore’s,130 the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), 
a civil rights and liberties activist group, has devised a specific program for 
monitoring police conduct in Illinois (the “ACLU Program”).131 The ACLU 
Program would openly audio record police officers “without their consent 
when (1) the officers are performing their public duties; (2) the officers are in 
public places; (3) the officers are speaking at a volume audible to the 
unassisted human ear; and (4) the manner of the recording is otherwise 
lawful.”132 The stated purpose of the program is to improve police practices 
and to detect and deter police misconduct.133 The ACLU says the audio 
 
 122. Kreimer, supra note 119, at 341 (noting that social networking sites like Facebook, along 
with sites like Flickr, YouTube, and TwitPic, have combined with increasingly usable blogging 
technology to enable any holder of an image to make it instantly available to the world at large). 
 123. Balko, supra note 120. 
 124. People v. Allison, No. 2009–CF–50 at 2 (Sept. 15, 2011) (order dismissing motion to 
declare 720 ILCS 5/14 unconstitutional), available at http://www.rcfp.org/sites/default/files/docs/ 
20120322_125429_allison_trial_court_decision.pdf. 
 125. Id. at 1. 
 126. Id. at 1–2. 
 127. Balko, supra note 120, at 22. 
 128. Ryan Haggerty & Jason Meisner, Illinois’ eavesdropping law under attack, CHICAGO 
TRIB., Jan. 2, 2012, at C1. 
 129. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 130. See Grimm, supra note 10. 
 131. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 588. 
 132. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 113, at 9. 
 133. Complaint at 4, ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 2010 WL 4386868 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2010) 
(No. 10 Civ. 5235). 
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recordings would be open, would occur during expressive events on public 
forums, and “would not occur when officers are off duty or in private places, 
and would not interfere with or endanger police or involve trespass.”134 When 
appropriate, the ACLU would publish the recordings to the general public and 
use the recordings to petition the government for redress of grievances.135 
So far, the ACLU has not implemented the program for fear of prosecution 
under the Illinois Eavesdropping Act.136 In August of 2010, the ACLU sued 
Anita Alvarez, in her official capacity as Cook County State’s Attorney, 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.137 Unfortunately, the case was 
dismissed for a lack of standing before the merits of the case could be 
reached.138 However, the ACLU has appealed the ruling and is asking the 
Seventh Circuit for a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of the 
eavesdropping statute as applied to its specified audio recording program.139 
Recently, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the ACLU of Illinois and entered a 
preliminary injunction preventing the enforcement of the Illinois 
eavesdropping statute against the ACLU’s employees or agents who openly 
record the oral communications of police officers when the officers are 
performing in their official duties in public places.140 
II.  THE PROTECTIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The debate over the constitutionality of state wiretapping laws like Illinois’ 
and Massachusetts’ focuses on the First Amendment. The First Amendment 
states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press.”141 It applies to the states and their political subdivisions 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.142 At first look, 
the protections of the First Amendment seem limited.143 “Speech” means “[t]he 
 
 134. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 113, at 9. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 10. 
 137. Complaint, supra note 133, at 1. 
 138. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, No. 10-cv-05235, 2010 WL 4386868 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 
2010), rev’d, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 139. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 140. Id. In granting the injunction, the court reviewed the Illinois eavesdropping law under 
intermediate scrutiny. While struggling to determine which variation of intermediate scrutiny to 
apply, the court stated that regardless of which variation to apply, the law was “not closely 
tailored to the government’s interest in protecting conversational privacy.” Id. at 607. The court 
went on to state “[i]f protecting privacy is the justification for the law, then the law must be more 
closely tailored to serve that interest in order to avoid trampling on speech and press rights.” Id. at 
608. 
 141. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 142. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000). 
 143. See Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: 
Towards A Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 
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expression or communication of thoughts or opinions in spoken words; 
something spoken or uttered.”144 “Press” has been described as “[t]he news 
media; print and broadcast news organizations collectively.”145 By those 
definitions, an individual’s recording of police activity fits in neither category. 
While the spoken words would constitute speech, the recording of those words 
by an individual (one not a member of a print or broadcast news organization) 
would not be. Furthermore, a recording would not be considered “press” unless 
a member of a print or broadcast news organization captured it. However, the 
Supreme Court has rejected a literal reading of the First Amendment, and it has 
established that the First Amendment guarantees freedom of expression146 and 
protects a range of conduct related to the gathering and dissemination of 
information.147 The next two sections illustrate the range of conduct the First 
Amendment protects, including the right to gather information—and the right 
to record information. 
A. The First Amendment Right to Gather Information and News 
As the Supreme Court stated, “the First Amendment . . . prohibit[s] 
government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the 
public may draw.”148 Originally, the right to gather information and news 
applied exclusively to the news media. Today, however, the public’s right of 
access to information is coexistent with that of the press,149 and the right to 
gather news and information applies equally to news media and the public at 
large.150 Changes in technology have made the lines between private citizens 
and journalists exceedingly difficult to draw.151 Due to the proliferation of 
 
250 (2004) (“[i]n their most literal form, the Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment 
protect the freedom to speak and the freedom to publish using a printing press.”). 
 144. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1529 (9th ed. 2009). 
 145. Id. at 1304; see David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 436 
(2002) (“The most famous discussion of the meaning of the Press Clause, a 1974 speech by 
Justice Stewart, identified its beneficiaries as ‘the daily newspapers and other established news 
media,’ or ‘newspapers, television networks, and magazines.’”). 
 146. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) (phrasing 
issue as “constitutional right to freedom of speech or expression”). 
 147. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 148. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 
U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is . . . well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive 
information and ideas.”). 
 149. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that the 
Constitution “assure[s] the public and the press equal access once government has opened its 
doors”). 
 150. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment does not 
guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the 
public generally.”). 
 151. Glik, 655 F.3d at 84. 
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electronic devices with video-recording capability, news stories are just as 
likely to be uncovered by a blogger at his or her computer as by a reporter at a 
major newspaper.152 Therefore, the newsgathering protections of the First 
Amendment cannot turn on professional credentials.153 Instead, the 
newsgathering protections of the First Amendment turn on who the subject of 
the recording is and whether the matter is one of public interest.154 
The right to gather information and news is especially important in the 
context of information regarding government officials.155 “Gathering 
information about government officials in a form that can readily be 
disseminated to others serves a cardinal First Amendment interest in protecting 
and promoting the free discussion of governmental affairs.”156 The Supreme 
Court has emphasized “the paramount public interest in a free flow of 
information to the people concerning public officials.”157 This is because 
public officials are deemed to be servants of the people.158 Many benefits are 
derived from ensuring the public’s right to gather information, such as aiding 
in uncovering abuse by government officials159 and creating a mechanism by 
which government operates more effectively.160 Furthermore, speech on 
matters of public concern is given heightened protection under the First 
Amendment.161 The Supreme Court has held that speech on matters of public 
concern is “fundamental”162 to the “heart”163 of the First Amendment, and a 
“core” value of the First Amendment.164 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id.; see also United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing 
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609, (1978)) (finding that the press has generally 
no right to information superior to that of the general public); Lambert v. Polk County, 723 F. 
Supp. 128, 133 (S.D. Iowa 1989) (“it is not just news organizations . . . who have First 
Amendment rights to make and display videotapes of events . . . .”). 
 154. Buller v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 684 S.W.2d 473, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). 
 155. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964), overruled on other grounds by Curtis 
Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1975). 
 156. Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (internal quotations omitted). 
 157. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 77. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1034–35 (1991). 
 160. See Press–Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). 
 161. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (“speech on public issues occupies the 
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values”); see also First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (noting that matters of public concern are at the heart of First 
Amendment protections). 
 162. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968). 
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B. The First Amendment Right to Record Information 
While it is clear that the gathering of information enjoys First Amendment 
protection, courts are mixed as to whether the recording of the same 
information receives First Amendment protection. Most courts have said 
yes.165 However, some have said no.166 The majority of courts have held that 
videotaping is a protected First Amendment activity when used to “gather 
information about what public officials do on public property”167 and when the 
recording has a communicative or expressive purpose.168 One court has gone 
so far as to hold that videotaping is a protected First Amendment right 
regardless of the reason for the videotaping.169 The next section considers 
those cases that have addressed the right to record police officers and other 
public officials while in their official capacities. 
III.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO AUDIO RECORD POLICE 
COMMUNICATIONS 
A. The Older Cases 
Staring in the mid-1990s, courts began to recognize a First Amendment 
right to record, videotape, and photograph police activity and conduct.170 The 
first court to do so was the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
Fordyce v. City of Seattle.171 In Fordyce, the court held that an individual who 
 
 165. See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 597 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that 
“[a]udio recording is entitled to First Amendment protection.”); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 
F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995); 
Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 1999); Demarest v. Athol/Orange Cmty. 
Television, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 82, 94–95 (D. Mass. 2002); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 
F. Supp. 634, 638 (D. Minn. 1972); Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 
2005). 
 166. See, e.g., Potts v. City of Lafayette, 121 F.3d 1106, 1111 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[T]here is 
nothing in the Constitution which guarantees the right to record a public event.”); see Whiteland 
Woods, L.P. v. Twp. of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that permitted 
access to Planning Commission meetings did not create a federal constitutional right to videotape 
the meetings). 
 167. Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333 (stating that “[t]he First Amendment protects the right to gather 
information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record 
matters of public interest”) (emphasis added); Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439 (recognizing a “First 
Amendment right to film matters of public interest”); Iacobucci, 193 F.3d at 25; Robinson, 378 F. 
Supp. 2d at 541 (“Videotaping is a legitimate means of gathering information for public 
dissemination . . . .”). 
 168. Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 212 n.14 (3d Cir. 2005); Larsen v. Fort Wayne Police 
Dept., 825 F. Supp. 2d 965, 979 (N.D. Ind. 2010). 
 169. Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 541 (stating that an individual need not assert any 
particular reason for videotaping). 
 170. Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439. 
 171. Id. at 436. 
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filmed a public demonstration on a public street had a “First Amendment right 
to film matters of public interest.”172 In that case, Mr. Fordyce was videotaping 
and audio recording people on the streets of Seattle during a public protest.173 
Among his subjects were police officers patrolling the protest.174 An officer 
eventually approached him and asked whether his video camera was recording 
audio.175 The officer then warned Fordyce that a Washington state privacy 
statute forbade recording private conversations without the consent of all 
participants.176 When he refused to stop recording, he was arrested for 
violating the statute.177 After the charges against Fordyce were dismissed, he 
brought a civil rights action against the officers for interference with his First 
Amendment right to gather news.178 On appeal, the court held that Fordyce had 
a “First Amendment right to film matters of public interest.”179 
In Robinson v. Fetterman, a district court held that the arrest of an 
individual for filming police activity from private property violated the First 
Amendment.180 In that case, Robinson videotaped police conducting truck 
inspections on a local road because he was concerned about the way the police 
were performing the inspections.181 He videotaped from an adjacent property 
approximately twenty to thirty feet from the road and never interfered with 
police activities.182 When approached by police, Robinson refused to stop 
filming and was subsequently arrested for violation of the Pennsylvania’s 
harassment statute.183 After noting that Robinson had First Amendment rights 
to receive information and ideas, and to express his concern about the safety of 
the truck inspections, the court held that “there can be no doubt that the free 
 
 172. Id. at 439. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 438. 
 175. Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439. 
 176. Id. The Washington wiretapping statute provides, in relevant part, that “it shall be 
unlawful for any individual . . . to intercept, or record any [p]rivate conversation . . . without first 
obtaining the consent of all the persons engaged in the conversation.” WASH. REV. CODE § 
9.73.030 (2006). 
 177. Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439. 
 178. Id. at 438. 
 179. Id. at 439. 
 180. 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 542 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
 181. Id. at 539. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 539. The Pennsylvania harassment statute provides, in relevant part “A person 
commits the crime of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another, the person: 
. . . follows the other person in or about a public place or places; [or] engages in a course of 
conduct or repeatedly commits acts which serve no legitimate purpose.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 
2709(a)(2)–(3) (2010). The district court’s opinion is unclear as to whether Robinson’s video 
recording also included audio recording. If it had, the officers may have charged Robinson with 
being in violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act. Id. 
§§ 5701–82. 
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speech clause of the Constitution protected Robinson as he videotaped the 
defendants.”184 
In Pomykacz v. Borough of West Wildwood, a district court held that 
photographing a police officer in connection with a citizen’s political activism 
was protected by the First Amendment.185 In that case, Pomykacz, a self-
described “citizen-activist,” became concerned over an alleged romantic 
relationship between the mayor of the city and a police officer.186 In the 
process of monitoring the parties, Pomykacz began photographing the officer 
while she was on duty.187 The officer and the mayor initiated criminal charges 
against Pomykacz for harassment.188 In her subsequent civil action, Pomykacz 
alleged that her arrest violated her First Amendment rights.189 The court 
declined to adopt Pomykacz’s blanket assertion that “the observation and 
monitoring of public officials is protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment.”190 
However, the court did imply that photography with an expressive or 
communicative purpose is protected by the First Amendment.191 
B. The Recent Cases 
Two U.S. Courts of Appeals cases, Glik v. Cunniffe192 from the First 
Circuit, and Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle193 from the Third Circuit, both shed 
light on the problems restrictive state wiretapping laws create and the 
ramifications they have on the rights encompassed by the First Amendment. 
1. Glik v. Cunniffe 
The facts of Glik v. Cunniffe are rather simple. Police arrested Simon Glik 
for using his cell phone’s digital video camera to film several police officers 
arresting a young man in the Boston Common.194 He was charged with 
violation of Massachusetts’ wiretapping statute.195 Glik was walking past the 
 
 184. Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 541. 
 185. 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 512–13 (D.N.J. 2006). 
 186. Id. at 506–07. 
 187. Id. at 507. 
 188. Id. at 508. 
 189. Pomykacz, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 512. 
 190. Id. at 513 n.14 (alteration in original). 
 191. Id. (noting language from the Third Circuit indicating that videotaping or recording 
police may be a protected activity). 
 192. 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 193. 622 F.3d 248, 248 (3d. Cir. 2010). 
 194. Glik, 655 F.3d at 79. 
 195. Id. The statute states: 
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this section any person who willfully 
commits an interception, attempts to commit an interception, or procures any other person 
to commit an interception or to attempt to commit an interception of any wire or oral 
communication shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned in the 
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Boston Common, a state park, when he witnessed three police officers 
arresting a young man.196 While witnessing the encounter, he heard a bystander 
say something to the effect of, “[y]ou are hurting him, stop.”197 Concerned that 
the officers were using excessive force, he stopped approximately ten feet 
away from the incident and began recording video footage of the arrest on his 
cell phone.198 
After detaining the suspect, an officer turned to Glik and said, “I think you 
have taken enough pictures.”199 He replied, “I am recording this. I saw you 
punch him.”200 An officer then approached him and asked if his cell phone 
recorded audio.201 When he affirmed that he was recording audio, the officer 
placed him in handcuffs and arrested him for unlawful audio recording in 
violation of the Massachusetts wiretapping statute.202 He was taken to the 
South Boston Police Station and, in the course of booking, his cell phone and 
computer flash drive were confiscated.203 The charges were eventually dropped 
because he had used his cell phone openly and in plain view to obtain the video 
and audio recording.204 He later filed a civil rights action against the officers 
and the City of Boston for violations of his First Amendment rights.205 The 
district court concluded that he had a First Amendment right to openly audio 
record the police encounter he witnessed.206 
On appeal, the First Circuit agreed.207 First, the court noted that the First 
Amendment right to openly record a police encounter does not hinge on 
whether the recorder is a private citizen or a member of the news media.208 
Next, the court found it pertinent that Glik filmed the police officers in the 
Boston Common, the oldest city park in the United States.209 The court went 
 
state prison for not more than five years, or imprisoned in a jail or house of correction for 
not more than two and one half years, or both so fined and given one such imprisonment. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(C)(1) (2010). 
 196. Glik, 655 F.3d at 79. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 79–80. 
 199. Id. at 80. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Glik, 655 F.3d at 80. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. Massachusetts law only prohibits a secret interception of an oral communication. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 99(B)(4) & (C)(1) (2010). 
 205. Glik, 655 F.3d at 80. Glik also alleged violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. 
However, those allegations are not addressed in this note. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 82. 
 208. Id. at 83–84 (holding that “the news-gathering protections of the First Amendment 
cannot turn on professional credentials or status.”). 
 209. Id. at 84. 
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on to state that “[i]n such traditional public spaces, the rights of the state to 
limit the exercise of First Amendment activity are ‘sharply circumscribed.’”210 
Furthermore, the Court found it pertinent that Glik’s recording did not interfere 
with the police officers’ performance of their duties.211 Lastly, the court noted 
that “police officers are expected to endure significant burdens caused by 
citizens’ exercise of their First Amendment rights.”212 
2. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle 
In Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, a truck was pulled over for speeding.213 A 
passenger recorded the encounter with a handheld video camera located in his 
lap.214 Eventually, the officer noticed that the passenger was filming him and 
arrested the passenger for violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and 
Electronic Surveillance Control Act.215 After the arrest, the passenger brought 
a civil action against the arresting officer, alleging that his First Amendment 
rights were violated when he was arrested for filming the officer during the 
traffic stop.216 The district court held that it was unclear whether the passenger 
had a right to videotape police performing their duties on public property.217 
Kelly marked the first time the Third Circuit directly addressed the right to 
videotape police officers.218 The Third Circuit had previously hypothesized 
that “videotaping or photographing the police in the performance of their 
duties on public property may be a protected activity.”219 Relying on caselaw 
from other courts, the court conceded that this right does exist.220 But the court 
framed the right narrowly, concluding that “videotaping without an expressive 
purpose may not be protected . . . .”221 Unfortunately, the court did not 
 
 210. Glik, 655 F.3d at 84 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 
37, 45 (1983)). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. (citing City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987) (“[T]he First Amendment 
protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers.”)). 
 213. 622 F.3d 248, 251 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 251–52. The Act provides that “a person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if 
he intentionally intercepts . . . any . . . oral communication . . . .” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5703(1) 
(2010). The statute defines “oral communication” as “[a]ny oral communication uttered by a 
person possessing an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under 
circumstances justifying such expectation.” Id. § 5702. 
 216. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 252. 
 217. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 2009 WL 1230309, at *8 (M.D.Pa. May 4, 2009), aff’d, 
622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 218. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 260. 
 219. Giles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 212 n.14 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). 
 220. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 260, 262. The court relied on cases within the Eleventh and Third 
Circuits to determine whether the right to record police officers exists. Id. at 260. 
 221. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] WHEN, WHERE AND WHY 1105 
elaborate on when a recording would be for an expressive purpose. However, it 
did cite a case for what constitutes an expressive purpose: Pomykacz v 
Borough of West Wildwood.222 In Pomykacz, a district court implied that 
videotaping for political activism reasons was a communicative or expressive 
purpose.223 Another case has suggested that the selling of photography and 
videography is an expressive purpose.224 Without indicating whether or not the 
recording of a traffic stop was an expressive activity, the court held that “the 
right to videotape police officers during traffic stops [is] not clearly 
established”.225 The court based its holding on two main reasons.226 First, the 
court noted that caselaw had yet to address recording of police in the context of 
a traffic stop.227 Second, the court characterized traffic stops as “inherently 
dangerous situations,”228 which demonstrated the court’s willingness to limit 
citizens’ First Amendment rights when safety concerns arise. 
The previous section addressed those courts which had recognized First 
Amendment rights to openly record police conduct during a public protest,229 
to openly film police conduct to unravel allegedly unsafe means of carrying 
out official duties,230 and to photograph a police officer in connection with a 
citizen’s political activism.231 After Glik and Kelly, an individual has a First 
Amendment right to openly record police conduct in a public park,232 but does 
not have an established First Amendment right to openly record officers in the 
discharge of their duties during a traffic stop.233 
What is the difference between a police-citizen encounter in the Boston 
Common and a police-citizen encounter at a traffic stop? For one, the Supreme 
Court has held that traffic stops are “especially fraught with danger to police 
officers.”234 In the eyes of the Supreme Court, the risk of harm to both the 
police and vehicle occupants is minimized “if the officers routinely exercise 
unquestioned command of the situation.”235 Second, a park, unlike a traffic 
 
 222. Id. at 261. 
 223. See Pomykacz v. Borough of W. Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 513 n.14 (D.N.J. 
2006). 
 224. See Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695–96 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 225. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262–63. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 262. 
 228. Id. at 262–63. 
 229. Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 438–39 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 230. Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
 231. See Pomykacz, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 513 n.14 (D.N.J. 2006). 
 232. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 233. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262–63 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 234. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1983). 
 235. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009). For this purpose, the Supreme Court has 
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stop, is a traditional “public space”236 where citizens are afforded heightened 
First Amendment protections. However, both encounters do have some 
similarities. To illustrate, the Glik court relied on the fact that Mr. Glik filmed 
the encounter from a safe distance and neither spoke to nor disturbed the 
officers in any way.237 The same is true in Kelly.238 The passenger, while he 
may have been closer to the officers, merely held the video camera in his lap 
without disturbing the officers. 
As seen by the foregoing caselaw, courts agree that recording police 
conduct and communications is, to some extent, a First Amendment right. The 
next section will examine the extent and contours of the First Amendment right 
to record. 
IV.  A SUBSTANTIAL INTERFERENCE GUIDELINE FOR INTERPRETING THE SCOPE 
AND LIMITATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO RECORD POLICE 
COMMUNICATIONS 
The Glik and Kelly courts both held that the right to record is not absolute, 
but is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.239 This 
language comes from the Supreme Court which has stated that the government 
may impose reasonable restrictions on the “time, place, or manner” of 
exercising First Amendment rights “provided the restrictions are justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”240 The Glik 
court stated, “[w]e have no occasion to explore those limitations . . . .”241 In 
this section, I will explore some of those limitations by suggesting the 
following guideline in determining the contours of the First Amendment right 
to record police communications: the First Amendment protects an individual’s 
right to audio record a uniformed, on duty police officer’s oral 
communications unless the recording would substantially interfere with the 
performance of the officer’s duties. 
The “substantial interference” guideline has two main parts. First, the 
officer must be on duty and uniformed. When I say uniformed, I am referring 
to officers who are in uniform, i.e., it is clearly apparent from their clothing 
that they are police officers acting in their official capacity at the time of the 
recording. The guideline is limited to communications of on duty, uniformed 
police officers because “[c]ommunications of this sort lack any reasonable 
 
 236. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983). 
 237. Glik, 655 F.3d at 84. 
 238. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262. 
 239. Glik, 655 F.3d at 84; Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262. 
 240. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (internal quotations omitted). 
 241. Glik, 655 F.3d at 84. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] WHEN, WHERE AND WHY 1107 
expectation of privacy . . . .”242 Because conversations uttered in the open are 
not protected from being overheard, an expectation of privacy cannot attach to 
the conversation.243 Furthermore, when I say public communications, I mean 
only those communications with members of the public. For instance, a right 
of privacy would be given to a communication between two officers sitting 
alone in a squad car talking between themselves because those are private, not 
public, communications. 
Second, the guideline provides that the recording must not substantially 
interfere with the performance of the officer’s duties. I take the substantial 
interference aspect of the guideline directly from Glik. Recall that in Glik, Mr. 
Glik filmed the police-citizen encounter from approximately ten feet away.244 
He never verbally or physically interacted with the citizen or the arresting 
officers.245 The court specifically stated two things that provide support for a 
guideline that hinges on a substantial interference standard. First, the court 
noted that “[s]uch peaceful recording of an arrest in a public space that does 
not interfere with the police officers’ performance of their duties is not 
reasonably subject to limitation.”246 The indication here is that if the recording 
were to interfere with the officers’ performance of their duties, the recording 
would be subject to limitation. Second, the court went on to note that “police 
officers are expected to endure significant burdens caused by citizens’ exercise 
of their First Amendment rights.”247 Based on the above two statements by the 
Glik court, a substantial interference standard properly balances the needs of 
effective law enforcement while ensuring that the interference must cross a 
high threshold before it is subject to limitation. 
Additionally, the guideline I have proposed does not hinge on who the 
recorder is. The recorder could be an individual talking directly to an officer, 
an individual not talking directly to an officer, but one in very close proximity 
such as the passenger in Kelly, or a bystander to the communication such as 
Mr. Glik. Support for declining to make a distinction among recorders also 
comes directly from Glik.248 Under the proposed guideline, the only pertinent 
and relevant issue is whether or not the recording would substantially interfere 
with the performance of the officer’s duties. On the plus side, the guideline 
strikes a balance between the First Amendment right to record and the practical 
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 243. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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needs of law enforcement. This is primarily accomplished in three ways. First, 
the officer must be uniformed. Second, the officer must be on duty. Third, the 
interference must be substantial before the First Amendment right to record is 
subject to limitation. 
Furthermore, while at this juncture it is unclear under what circumstances a 
recording would substantially interfere with the performance of an officer’s 
duties, the Supreme Court has endorsed a case-by-case standard for substantial 
interference in restricting First Amendment rights.249 In the context of the free 
speech rights afforded to public school children, the Court has held that that 
public schools may restrict the First Amendment speech rights of students only 
when necessary to “avoid . . . substantial interference with schoolwork or 
discipline.”250 A similar restraint-based approach is applicable to police 
officers. Like public school officials, police officers are public servants251 and 
are accordingly “expected to endure significant burdens caused by citizens’ 
exercise of their First Amendment rights.”252 
For instance, does the recording done by the passenger in Kelly 
substantially interfere?253 I think not. The passenger, who was the person 
recording, was not even involved in the stop, and was not the one being 
questioned by the officer.254 The recording may have interfered minimally, but 
even so, as stated in Glik, the officer was expected to “endure significant 
burdens caused by citizens’ exercise of their First Amendment rights.”255 In a 
similar vein, it is clear that in Commonwealth v. Hyde, Mr. Hyde’s recording 
did not substantially interfere with the officers’ performance of their duties, as 
it was unknown to the officers that Hyde was recording.256 Under my 
guideline, secret recordings would nearly always be permissible because they 
are just that: secret. Officers would not be aware that a recording is occurring 
and thus there would be no chance for interference, let alone substantial 
interference. However, if officers were physically prevented from reaching the 
scene of an accident or arresting an individual due to or due in large part to a 
recording, that would likely constitute a substantial interference. Lastly, what if 
Mr. Glik had recorded the encounter from five feet away instead of ten feet? It 
seems logical to concede that the closer the recorder is to the police encounter, 
the higher the chance of substantial interference with the officer’s duties. 
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However, it is equally conceivable that a substantial interference, under certain 
circumstances, could occur from two feet away or from twenty feet away. 
One commentator has suggested a federal statutory solution for remedying 
defective state wiretapping laws.257 This commentator suggests a rebuttable 
presumption that an on duty officer’s oral communications, if uttered in the 
public sphere, are subject to recording.258 The presumption is rebutted only if 
the recording would “create or significantly exacerbate a substantial risk of 
imminent harm to the police officer, other persons, or national security.”259 
My guideline differs in two basic ways. First, instead of a federal statutory 
solution, the states are free to amend their own wiretapping laws. As noted in 
Part I, the validity of both the Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Act and the 
Illinois Eavesdropping Act has been called into doubt.260 An Illinois lawmaker 
has already proposed changes to the Illinois Eavesdropping Act that would 
allow individuals to audio record a police officer working in public without the 
officer’s consent.261 While the proposed amendment does not strike the balance 
my guideline seeks, it shows that state lawmakers are aware that restrictive 
wiretapping laws need to be amended. Second, my guideline, instead of 
hinging on safety, hinges on whether the recording would substantially 
interfere with the performance of the officer’s duties. A substantial interference 
standard is a better approach for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has 
already endorsed this approach in restricting First Amendment rights, albeit in 
other contexts.262 Second, the standard strikes a better balance between the 
needs of law enforcement and the right to record under the First Amendment. 
For instance, under the safety of the officer standard,263 it is predictable that a 
court would rule that drivers and passengers could not record their 
communications with police officers during a traffic stop since the Supreme 
Court has held that traffic stops are “especially fraught with danger to police 
officers.”264 Under my proposed guideline, the recording would be permitted 
unless it would substantially interfere with the officer’s performance of their 
duties, allowing a greater exercise of individuals’ First Amendment rights. 
 
 257. Kies, supra note 42, at 307 (proposing amendment to federal law to balance the First 
Amendment right to record police communications with police officers’ privacy interests). 
 258. Id. at 308. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See supra text accompanying notes 194–212, 130–40. 
 261. H.B. 3944, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011). 
 262. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
 263. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 264. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 
1047 (1983)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1110 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1085 
CONCLUSION 
As evidenced by Ms. Moore’s arrest and subsequent prosecution, violation 
of state wiretapping laws can have grave consequences.265 However, courts, for 
the most part, are in agreement that the recording of police conduct and 
communications, to some extent, is a First Amendment newsgathering right.266 
The standard that I have proposed, one that hinges on a substantial interference 
in the performance of the officer’s duties, accomplishes two goals. First, it 
offers a guideline for determining the scope and contours of the First 
Amendment right to record police communications. Second, it provides states 
like Illinois and Massachusetts a guideline for revamping their constitutionally 
defective wiretapping laws. 
The ACLU’s proposed program for monitoring police conduct267 fits 
squarely within the parameters of my proposed guideline. As stated by the 
ACLU, the recordings would be limited to on duty officers while in public and 
would not interfere with the performance of the officer’s duties.268 In a time 
when nearly every American owns a cell phone capable of recording audio, the 
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